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Abstract: We discuss the use of POLYAS, an Internet voting system, in GI elec-
tions before 2010, in 2010 and 2011, as well as in future. We briefly describe how 
the system was extended in 2010 to provide partial verifiability and how the integ-
rity of the GI election result was verified in the 2010 and 2011 elections. Infor-
mation necessary for partial verifiability has so far only been made available to a 
small group of researchers. In future it would be ideal to make this, and more in-
formation, available to the general public, or to GI members, in order to increase 
the level of verifiability. We highlight legal considerations accompanying these 
possibilities, including publishing more details about the election results, the re-
quirement for secret elections and avoiding vote buying, and how to handle com-
plaints. Motivated by legal constraints, we propose further improvements to the 
POLYAS system. Finally, we generalize our findings to any partially verifiable In-
ternet voting system. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Internet voting systems for legally binding elections have predominantly been black box 
systems, for example in Estonia for the federal elections [MM06], and in the elections 
for the Austrian Federation of Students [KET10]. One needs to trust that these systems 
work as they should, which is not ideal for elections. The GI – German Society for 
Computer Scientists (Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V.) - has also used such a black box 
Internet voting system, namely the POLYAS system, for its elections since 2004. In 
2010, modifications were proposed to introduce partial verifiability in POLYAS 
[OSV11]. While partial verifiability may not be considered optimal, the assurance it 
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offers to voters is likely to increase their trust in election results. However, only a small 
group of researchers has so far been able to verify the processes for the GI elections in 
2010 and 2011. Obviously, there is a need to make partial verifiability available to the 
general public, or at best to GI members. Public verifiability, however, requires publish-
ing of information previously kept secret. We address this from a legal point of view and 
provide recommendations for future GI elections.  
 
Furthermore, we identify a flaw in [OSV11] that allows an attacker to coerce voters as a 
result of publishing information needed to partially verify the election process. We pro-
pose a technical improvement that significantly mitigates the risk of the outlined attack. 
While the addressed issues with respect to partial verifiability can be overcome by tech-
nical means, handling of complaints remains an open problem. We therefore recommend 
partially implementing the proposal of [OSV11] for future GI elections. Our findings 
regarding handling of complaints are generalized to any partially verifiable voting sys-
tem. 
 
In section 2 of this paper, we provide background information on the POLYAS voting 
system and its use in the GI 2010 and 2011 elections. Section 3 looks at challenges aris-
ing from making partial verifiability publicly available by publishing details of the elec-
tion results. In section 4, we discuss the risk of vote selling, which is likely to occur 
when the general public can verify the processes as researchers did for the 2010 and 
2011 elections. Section 5 focuses on our proposal addressing the publishing of hash 
chain information for the purpose of integrity with respect to the risk of coercion. Sec-
tion 6 analyses complaint handling, and we conclude in section 7 with a statement on 
these challenges and present future work. 
 
 
2  Background 
 
We first provide our definitions for verifiability and then review the POLYAS system, 
discuss how partial verifiability is provided, and look at the application of partial verifia-
bility in the GI 2010 and 2011 elections. 
 
 
2.1 Verifiability  
 
Verifiability can be categorized as universal verifiability and individual verifiability. We 
use the definitions given by [OSV11]. Individual verifiability focuses on the voter and 
enables him to verify that his vote is properly prepared and sent to the voting server (cast 
as intended), and his vote is stored unaltered in the ballot box (stored as cast). Universal 
verifiability, enables any interested party to verify the proper tallying of all votes stored 
in the ballot box. 
 
 







The various components of POLYAS are discussed in this section. We look at the proto-
col that runs during the voting phase including one special mechanism, the hash chain 
mechanism, and the post-voting phase of the protocol. 
Components: POLYAS is made up of the Electoral Registry Server (ERS), the Valida-
tion Server (VS), and the Ballot Box Server (BBS). An off-line Tallying Component (TC) 
is used to tally votes (loaded in an encrypted state from BBS). A discussion on how these 
components work is presented in [RJ07] and [MR10]. In a GI election set up, ERS is 
administered by the GI at a computing centre, while all other components are located at 
Micromata. 
Voting phase: A voter authenticates himself at the election website using his voter ID 
and voting TAN (received via postal mail). These credentials are verified by ERS which 
forwards the TAN to VS. VS checks its database for this particular TAN and generates a 
random voting token (VT) if the TAN is valid, and no VT has previously been generated 
for this voter. VS sends the voting token to BBS and ERS. ERS forwards the token back 
to the voter. The voter receives a ballot from BBS and proceeds to make his candidate 
selection on the ballot. This selection along with the token VT is sent to BBS and the 
selection is stored for the final tallying only when the voter confirms his vote. BBS in-
forms ERS that the voter corresponding to a particular VT has cast his vote. ERS and 
BBS delete the copy of VT in order to maintain voter secrecy, and ERS invalidates the 
voter ID to prevent double voting. The voter then receives confirmation of a successfully 
cast vote.  
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Fig. 1: A simplified view of the voting phase in POLYAS 
 
Hash chain: POLYAS uses a hash chain mechanism during the voting phase to enable 






and are then stored in a randomized order in BBS in blocks of 30 2. After receiving the 
first 30 votes, BBS concatenates the encrypted votes, attaches an initial hash value in the 
first round, computes the hash using SHA-256, and signs the output using its private 
signature key. The output of the hash function and the signed version are sent to ERS for 
storage. An acknowledgement message is sent back to BBS. The next block of 30 votes 
is attached to this hashed output and SHA-256 applied again. This process is repeated for 
all available votes. If the last block of votes contains less than 30 votes, they are not 
included in the hash chain. 
Post-voting phase: At the end of the voting period, all encrypted votes are downloaded 
from BBS and uploaded to TC. The decryption key is input into TC and all votes are 
decrypted and tallied. 
 




2.3  Partial Verifiability in POLYAS 
 
A concept to enable partial verifiability in POLYAS was proposed in [OSV11]. A verifi-
ability tool was developed and applied in the GI 2010 elections and later extended for 
the GI 2011 elections. The tool provides universal verifiability by taking the encrypted 
votes from BBS and the decryption key as inputs, decrypting all the votes and tallying 
them.  The decryption key can be provided without violating secrecy of the vote, because 
there is no link between the encrypted vote and the corresponding voter. Assuming that 
the election results are published, the result obtained from the verifiability tool is com-
pared to the result announced by TC. This tool also facilitates partial individual verifia-
bility through use of the hash chain. The encrypted votes and the initial hash value are 
required as inputs. The tool generates the hash chain information afresh and compares 
the values obtained to those stored at ERS. If there is any discrepancy, then manipulation 
can be detected. In this way, one can verify that after the hash value of a block is com-
puted and sent to ERS, votes in this corresponding block cannot be altered in the ballot 
box without detection, under the assumption that ERS and BBS do not collaborate. How-
ever, note that if a malicious BBS alters votes before they are stored in the ballot box and 
before the hash value is computed, then this would not be detected.  Besides the verifia-
bility tool, [OSV11] proposed that the html code be checked to verify that the vote is cast 
as intended.  Even with these extensions, POLYAS provides only partial verifiability as 
the process from receiving the vote and computing the corresponding hash value current-
ly cannot be verified. 
 
 
2.4  Application of the Verifiability Tool in the GI 2010 and 2011 Elections 
 
The GI holds elections once every year. In 2010, the election had a single race for the 
management board. There were nine eligible candidates and three positions to be filled. 
                                                            






3,193 voters participated via Internet voting and 51 voters by postal 3 voting. In 2011, 
the election had two races - for the presiding council and the management board. A voter 
could cast a Yes or No vote for each candidate in the presiding council race, and three 
votes in the management board race. 3,244 voters participated via Internet voting and 45 
voters by postal voting.  
 
The verifiability tool was used in the 2010 elections. After extension to cater for two 
races, it was used for the 2011 elections. Both elections were successfully verified. For 
both these elections, the GI opted not to make the information required to verify the 
election result publicly available. The interface specification which allowed implementa-
tion of the verifiability tool was only provided to researchers. Access to this information 
and the election data necessary to carry out verifiability required signing of a non-
disclosure agreement regarding the data provided, and proprietary information on POL-
YAS.  
 
In terms of verifiability, it would be ideal if this information was made available to all 
GI members or even the general public. In addition, more information should be made 
available to further increase the level of verifiability.  We discuss in the following sec-
tions legal and technical considerations for these extensions. 
 
 
3  Publishing Complete Election Results 
 
One consequence of enabling every GI member to verify as described in section 2.4 is 
that they can compute the number of selections per candidate including the number of 
selections from Internet voters and those using the postal channel. This is possible be-
cause of the information available for verifiability and the published total result.  
 
Until now, the GI only published the winning candidate’s votes, preferring not to dis-
close the number of votes received by candidates who were not elected. Internet votes 
and postal votes are also not distinguished. In this section, we first consider legal re-
quirements for publishing these details regarding the election results and discuss which 
body bears the responsibility of deciding whether to publish them or not. 
 
 
3.1  Is there a legal requirement to publish complete and detailed election results? 
 
In March 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the principle of the public 
nature of elections (Article 38 in conjunction with Article 20.1 and 20.2 of the Basic 
Law - Grundgesetz - GG) requires that all essential steps in elections are subject to pub-
lic examinability, unless other constitutional interests justify an exception [BVerG09]. 
Particular significance is attached here to the monitoring of the election act and to the 
ascertainment of the election result [BVerfG09]. 
 
                                                            






However, private associations vested with legal capacity, like the GI, are allowed to 
regulate their elections and acclamations on their own [RGO09]. This is a result of the 
autonomy of association, a part of the constitutional principle of freedom of association 
(Article 9.1 GG) [El12]. As such, the association is free to regulate and formulate its 
affairs within the mandatory rules [Fl08]. This is regulated by law in § 25 of the Civil 
Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB). § 40 BGB contains the right of the association 
to regulate their matters in articles of association according to their purposes [SSW10]. 
Therefore, the electoral principles (Article 38.1 in conjunction with Article 20.1 and 20.2 
GG), which have to be observed at parliamentary elections, do not apply to elections of 
associations to the same degree and have to match with the autonomy of association 
[RGO09]. 
 
In matters associated with the proceedings of the GI elections, the autonomy of associa-
tion of Article 9 GG is decisive. The legal arrangement of the electoral proceedings is 
delivered to the members of the association and can be specified by creating articles of 
association and subordinate electoral order in private autonomy [RGO09]. The GI 
availed itself of this opportunity by admitting electronic elections in § 3.5.4 of the arti-
cles of association and regulating full particulars in the implementing provision Election 
Order (Ordnung der Wahlen und Abstimmungen - OWA). Although § 3.5.4 of the OWA 
regulates the publication of the results, there are no rules on publishing of the vote allo-
cation, providing a listing of the results and differentiating between postal votes and 
Internet votes.  
 
Generally the elections of the management board and the presiding council are resolu-
tions of the meeting of members according to § 32 BGB. The proclamation of a resolu-
tion of the meeting of members is however not mandatory for the validity of a resolution 
[BGH75] [SSW10]. Even though it is stated in the articles of association that the organ-
izer of the meeting of members, who is the returning officer, has to proclaim the resolu-
tions of the meeting of members, this is generally considered only as a regulatory action 
[SSW10].  
 
As a result, an association, and in particular the GI, is neither compelled to publish de-
tailed information about the election nor to distinguish between specific forms of elec-
tions when publishing the results. However, it is also not forbidden.  The remaining 
question therefore is to determine who can decide on publishing the election results. This 
is discussed in the following subsection. 
 
 
3.2 Which GI body is allowed to decide on publishing election results? 
 
The management board named in § 7.2 of the articles of association is the management 
board in terms of § 26 BGB and therefore the legal representative of the GI. This body is 
responsible for all affairs of the GI, which are not assigned to other bodies by the articles 
of association. The duties and authorities of the presiding council are mentioned in § 8.6 
of the articles of association. Therein the decree about the implementing provision of the 







Since there is no regulation for publishing of results, the GI might regulate precisely in 
the OWA to which extent the election results are released to the public. The presiding 
council is responsible for a modification of the OWA. Otherwise the management board 
is authorized to decide on the scale of the publication of the electoral results because of 
the authority mentioned in § 7.2 of the articles of association. Note, one could also de-
cide to only publish the results in the internal area of the GI web page, providing access 
only to GI members.  
 
 
4  Secret Elections and the Risk of Vote Selling 
 
As it is generally possible to enable the publishing of all relevant information for verifia-
bility, we analyse in this section whether the publication of the information required to 
verify future elections violates the secrecy of the vote.  
 
 
4.1  Problem Description 
 
In the GI elections, voters have multiple votes to cast and two races are held in parallel 
every second year. The risk of vote selling arises with such types of elections through the 
signature attack (also known as the Italian attack). In this attack, a coercer 4 asks the 
voter to vote in an identifiable way for his preferred candidate. The voter would select 
this particular candidate and use the remaining votes to form a signature with his vote. 
Since the information to verify also enables a coercer to deduce all individual votes, he 
can confirm compliance with his instructions by searching through all the votes for the 
voter’s signature.  
 
For the 2011 GI elections, given how POLYAS stores cast votes, there were 5,632 dif-
ferent possibilities to cast a vote.5 This number of possibilities is obtained as follows: 
POLYAS stores the votes in the two ballots such that they can be linked to each other. 
The presiding council race had five candidates (a maximum of three could be selected), 
and another four candidates were available for the management board (for each candi-
date a Yes or No vote could be cast). An option for an invalid vote is provided on each 
ballot. POLYAS stores exactly what the voter selected, i.e. if in the first race he selected 
four candidates and the invalid button then exactly this information was stored. In the 
best case scenario, the coercer would ask a voter to vote for candidate A and create a 
signature along with this valid vote. The voter would then still have up to two selections 
to make out of four remaining candidates for the first race. In the second race, he can 
decide Yes or No for each option and whether or not to select the invalid option since the 
second vote can also be invalid. This does not influence the first race and the vote for 
candidate A. The total number of possibilities for a unique signature is given by the 
equation below: 
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(i.e. 11 signatures from the first ballot * 512 signatures from the second ballot) where 2 
is the maximum number of votes that remain in the first race for the voter to choose 
from, 4 is the total number of candidates the voter can now choose from in the first race, 
and 9 is the number of vote options available in race 2. Note, this attack was also possi-
ble in the postal voting approach used by the GI before Internet voting was introduced 
(where both votes were put in one envelope). GI members who were part of the tallying 
process and physically present at the GI headquarters in Bonn could search through all 
the votes to identify those which had the required signatures. As publishing the infor-
mation to verify makes the data required for this attack more easily accessible, this at-
tack would become much more attractive.   
 
Similar to the discussion regarding publishing results, clarification is first needed on 
whether the GI’s regulations require secret elections (this is not the case for all societies 
because the members can also agree to non-secret elections). 
 
 
4.2 Do GI Regulations Dictate Secret Elections? 
 
Since associations are autonomous, they are allowed to form their own voting proce-
dures in virtue of Article 9.1 GG. The requirements for secret elections for associations 
differ from those for the elections of the Lower House of the German Federal Parliament 
(Bundestag) in virtue of Article 38.1 sentence 1 GG. If, however, an association opts for 
secret elections, the secrecy of individual voting decisions must be guaranteed [RGO09]. 
 
The Requirements on Internet-based Elections of Associations (GI-Anforderungen an 
Internetbasierte Vereinswahlen) [GI05], is an implementation rule of the articles of asso-
ciation developed by a working committee of the GI’s chairmanship. It declares that the 
secrecy of elections has to be ensured by mathematical methods and concepts of ano-
nymity. This indicates that the principle of secrecy of elections is intended by the GI and 
thus must be considered as an election requirement. The principle of the secrecy of elec-
tions under Article 38.1 sentence 1 GG prescribes that the election procedure has to be 
carried out in such a way that the decision of the voter remains unknown [Sc09]. At the 
same time the secrecy of elections defends the freedom of election [Mo06]. The voter is 
protected from coercion and the candidate is safe from the postulations of ‘his’ voters. 
 
Therefore, since the GI requires secret elections, the risk of vote selling based on the 
above described signature attack is a problem for which a solution must be sought before 




4.3 Technical Solution Proposal 
 
To mitigate the risk of the signature attack, we propose that the ballot is split into two 
ballots, one for each race, and stored in a way that they can no longer be linked to each 
other. The number of possible signatures would be greatly reduced in the same scenario 






available signatures in the first race if the voter was coerced or sold his vote for candi-
date A. Note that in this approach, the second race cannot be used to create a signature as 
both votes will be stored independently and in such a way that they cannot be linked to 
each other. In the case where the adversary forces the voter to vote for candidate B in the 
second race, the coercer then only has 27 possibilities to create signatures to cast a valid 
vote by: 
    #  𝑠𝑖𝑔 = !!
!
!!!
⋅ 2! = 27 
i.e., the voter can now choose up to three remaining candidates with a yes, no or blank 
vote, thus there are three options. With this proposal, the adversary’s number of possible 
signatures decreases significantly to 11 in the first race and 27 in the second race. 
 
Another case, though not very attractive, is where the adversary forces the voter to cast 
an invalid vote (or buys an invalid vote). The number of possibilities to cast a vote for 
the second race 6 corresponds to 512, from which there are 431 invalid votes. To further 
improve the situation for this specific attack we propose that invalid votes are stored 
with no further information about the selected candidates, that is, there is no need to 
store further information from the ballot other than that the voter made an invalid vote 
selection. This proposal reduces to one option the number of possibilities the adversary 
has available to demand invalid votes, thus the attack is no longer possible. 
 
From a legal point of view, these technical solutions are an improvement as secret elec-




5  Publishing Hash Chain Information 
 
In the 2010 and 2011 elections, the hash chain information which was stored at ERS was 
only provided at the end of the election. Thus, one needed to trust that ERS and BBS did 
not collaborate to modify the ballot box (BBS) and the hash chain (ERS) accordingly.  
However, it will improve the level of verifiability if the hash chain information is pro-
vided on a real-time basis on a public web page (Bulletin Board - BB), if required only 
for GI members in the internal GI portal7. In this way the members would be able to 
verify that no votes were modified after being included in the hash chain. As such, the 
assumption that ERS and BBS do not collaborate would no longer hold because a modifi-
cation of the database with the encrypted votes and the corresponding hash values would 
be detected as the these values would not match with those on the BB. However, the idea 
of publishing this information immediately also has a drawback which is discussed in the 
following subsection.  
 
 
5.1 Problem Description 
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A drawback to providing the hash chain information on a real-time basis is the fact that a 
voter would know in which block their vote is stored as he could visit the BB before 
casting his vote, for example, for candidate A, and observe that currently x hash values 
are published. He would then be able to tell a coercer that he voted for candidate A (as 
demanded by the coercer) and that his vote was stored in block x+1. The coercer would 
decrypt the votes at the end of the election and check on the votes in this specific block 
to verify the statement (again this is possible due to the verifiability discussed in sections 
2.3 and 2.4).  
 
A coercer, in this scenario, only has to access the 30 votes in a given block while there 
were in total 11 possibilities to cast a vote in the first race and 27 for the second race. 
Thus, the signature attack would again become more attractive if publishing the hash 
chains during the election is already being done.  
 
From a legal perspective, this is not acceptable, in order to preserve secret elections. 
Therefore, we discuss possible improvements in the following subsection. 
 
 
5.2 Technical Solution Proposals 
 
To avoid disclosing this information, publishing the hash chain information could be 
delayed. A voter would then not know exactly which block contained his vote as several 
would be released simultaneously. This would, however, decrease the level of verifiabil-
ity because it provides a larger time frame within which votes can be manipulated with-
out detection. 
 
A second proposal is to split the ballot further, distributing the individual votes across 
the ballot box database and the hash chain. Rather than storing the votes from an indi-
vidual voter together in the database and hash chain, these individual votes for specific 
candidates are randomly distributed and stored. Thus from the database and the hash 
chain, individual ballots cannot be reconstructed while it is possible to tally the votes per 
candidate and to verify at the end of the election that votes in the ballot box have not 
been changed after the hash chain was computed. A voter knowing which block his vote 
is stored in has nearly no knowledge that can be used by a coercer, and is thus prevented 
from selling his vote or being coerced.  
 
Note, this also means that the honest voter who has not been coerced has less infor-
mation. If he wants to verify at the end of the election whether his vote is in the corre-
sponding block he also cannot reconstruct his vote. However, this is acceptable since the 
hash chain is used to detect manipulation in the database after the hash values are pub-
lished which was the main motivation for introducing hash chains. This possibility re-
mains unaffected. 
 
The measures of protection discussed in this section above are taken to avoid disclosing 
potentially sensitive information. As such, publishing hash chain information without 
delay but modifying how information is stored is acceptable from a legal point of view 








6  Complaints 
 
Other than secrecy requirements for the election, there is a second challenge with respect 
to publishing hash chain information during the election, that is, how to handle com-
plaints regarding the verifiable information. 
 
 
6.1 Problem Description 
 
A voter may check for the block number before casting his vote, and then complain that 
his vote is not included in that particular block, e.g. he selected candidate A while none 
of the votes in this block contains a vote for candidate A. Note, even though the voter 
does not know which is his vote, he can deduce that none of the votes contained the 
selection of candidate A. This situation is particularly difficult to handle as valid and 
invalid complaints cannot be distinguished. A dishonest voter may also attempt to make 
a falsified complaint e.g. by selecting a block where no vote for candidate A is included 
and claiming that his vote is missing.  Therefore, an approach is needed to handle com-
plaints in order to allow immediate publication of the hash chain information. We first 
evaluate who has the burden of proof and then discuss what can be used as proof to file a 
complaint and how it would be handled by a court of law.  
 
 
6.2 Who bears the burden of proof? 
 
The judgment of the German Federal High Court of Justice states that every breach of 
mandatory law or articles of association causes the invalidity of adjudication. If the 
breach does not concern mandatory rules but procedural rules, which do not attend su-
perordinate interests but the protection of individuals, the decision only becomes void if 
the voter protests against the decision [El12]. 
 
Relating to an action of an association against one of its members, the Federal Court of 
Justice decided that the association has to prove the conformance of a decision with the 
articles of association, if the association wants to derive rights from an acclamation and 
if the member claims adverseness of the acclamation [BGH68]. Conversely, a member 
filing an action for a declaratory judgment and claiming the invalidity of an association 
election has to prove non-conformance with the articles of association. If someone 
claims the invalidity of a registered decision, the burden of proof generally rests on him 
[El12], [BGH68]. 
 
For the GI elections, this means that only breaches of mandatory rules of the articles of 
association or of the implementation rules cause invalidity of the election decision. It is 
up to the court of justice to determine this in particular cases. Every member of an asso-
ciation is allowed to file an action for a declaratory judgment in virtue of § 256 of the 






lidity of an election. In this case the member bears the burden of proof of the defect. 
Members therefore must have the possibility to control the election. Correspondingly, 




6.3 What can be used and accepted as proof for complaints? 
 
The data that the POLYAS system itself currently provides for verifiability cannot be 
used as proof. However, voters could try to use technical aids to prove their claims, 
capturing voting actions using video or screenshots. If such a video would cover check-
ing the block and then casting a vote, it can act as a proof, though it is not clear if videos 
or screenshots are not manipulated. Voters may present witnesses to confirm their state-
ment, but due to the possibility of manipulation, it can be assumed that the court is un-
likely to admit this as proof.  
 
Since there exists the opinion that a voter is not allowed to reveal his own voting deci-
sion in court as it violates the secrecy of elections [BVerwG76], it seems impossible that 
a court will admit the examination of a third person as a witness because this would 
mean further breach of secrecy. The voter could insist on appearing as a witness in per-
son by arguing that there is no other chance to provide evidence that the system malfunc-
tioned. It is not possible to judge on the voter’s experiences and problem description as 
valid complaints can still not be distinguished from invalid ones, and the voter himself 
cannot prove his complaint. By refusing this evidence, the court would deprive the voter 
of his legal protection [MüKo2012] 8. Rejecting all complaints as voters are not able to 
prove their statement with this system would also mean that valid complaints will not be 
examined further. To avoid the uncertain result of a legal proceeding, the association 
could establish an internal structure to scrutinize elections. However, for the moment, it 
cannot be recommended to publish the hash chain information during the election as 
there exists no corresponding regulation for the GI.  
 
 
7  Conclusion 
 
In the recent past we have seen a greater use of Internet voting systems. While ideally 
these systems would provide the user the possibility to verify the election outcome, 
many of those used in practice are black box systems. Voters therefore need to trust the 
systems. One example of a black box Internet voting system is the POLYAS system, 
used for the GI elections since 2004.  
 
In 2011, the authors in [OSV11] proposed an improvement to POLYAS by publishing of 
the election results and the hash chain information to increase the level of verifiability, 
which is referred to as partial verifiability. In this paper we analysed the legal considera-
tions for the GI elections using this version of POLYAS. This includes the need to pub-
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lish election results for all candidates. We showed that this is not clearly regulated in the 
GI acts and that the presiding council is in charge of this. We then discussed whether 
publishing the information proposed in [OSV11] violates the secrecy of the vote. We 
showed that vote selling or coercion using the signature attack becomes more attractive. 
As this caused legal concerns, we proposed a splitting of ballots in multiple race elec-
tions in order to maintain secret elections and enable partial verifiability for future GI 
elections. 
 
Even though the publishing of election results is justifiable under the modifications 
made, the publishing of hash chain information during the election may still suffer from 
signature attacks. We therefore presented a randomization concept which allows binding 
the ballot box server to its content and thereby ensuring integrity while at the same time 
significantly mitigating the risk of voter coercion. However, as handling of complaints 
turned out to be an open problem, we do not recommend publishing the hash chain in-
formation during the election. Therefore, it is recommended to clarify whether results 
per candidate can be published. If this is the case, then the improved extension for POL-
YAS should be applied for future GI elections without publishing the hash chain infor-
mation during the election. Recently, discussions with the POLYAS developers began 
regarding the corresponding problems and legal restrictions. For the future, we plan to 
closely collaborate to resolve these challenges. Future work will investigate how com-
plaints can be handled and if they are only a challenge to voting systems that provide 
partial verifiability or also to voting systems that provide end-to-end verifiability. A look 
at Civitas [CCM08] offers a potential solution. Since vote updating is enabled, a voter 
can update their vote, rather than raise a complaint, if they detect manipulation. Thereby, 
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